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Securing Space for Local Peacebuilding:  
The Role of International and National Civilian Peacekeepers 
 
Abstract 
While large multilateral peace operations arrive with agendas extending into governance, economics, and 
other reforms, unarmed civilian peacekeeping (UCP) interventions focus on contributing to sufficiently safe 
space for local efforts at peacebuilding to proceed, at the request of local partners. They use a variety of 
nonviolent methods to increase the safety for local leaders and everyday people to engage in (re)building 
peace infrastructures and governance, within their own culture and contexts.  This paper examines the 
potential for international interveners to support local efforts based on local invitations, local staff, conflict 
and context analysis, and living in conflict affected communities, followed by a case study of the Nonviolent 
Peaceforce South Sudan project. This project is helping to revitalize or create community peace 
infrastructures in coordination with local partners, other peacekeepers and humanitarian agencies, local 
government, army and other armed actors. This has saved lives, contributed to improved policing, improved 
relations between ethnic groups, supported local peace actors, and increased the effectiveness of multilateral 
peace operations and humanitarian aid work focused on physical safety. 
 
Key words: unarmed civilian peacekeeping, peacebuilding, protection, violence prevention, South 
Sudan 
 
Introduction 
Unarmed Civilian Peacekeeping (UCP) is a developing practice that combines nonviolence and 
peacekeeping by which unarmed civilians protect other civilians in areas at risk of, or experiencing, 
direct political violence. While peacekeeping and peacebuilding are often conceptualised as 
distinct stages and tasks, this paper discusses the link between them and describes ways in which 
the practice of UCP contributes to peacebuilding work that is grounded in local communities and 
follows local leadership. By peacebuilding we mean changes in structural contradictions, 
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relationships between conflicted parties, and individual attitudes and behaviours,1 which 
contribute to a more sustainable, long term absence of direct political violence.  There is a growing 
body of work that discusses the purpose and effectiveness of unarmed civilians protecting 
individual civilians such as human rights defenders or other community activists,2 or more broadly 
focused on providing protection to whole communities or groups within a community.3  Though 
not connected to the literature on unarmed civilian peacekeeping (UCP) referred to above, there is 
also growing attention paid to the challenges of protecting civilians,4  and to the ways in which 
civilians in the midst of armed conflicts, protect themselves.5  Recently there has There has been 
increased much less attention to the connections between peacekeeping of any sort and in 
particular, that which is oriented to protection of civilians, and the work of peacemaking and 
peacebuilding, focused on the challenges posed by the increasing complexity of peace operations 
that include both aspects in their mandates.6 , though Carriere is one of the few who addresses the 
                                                 
1 Berghof Foundation, Berghof Glossary on Conflict Transformation,  http://www.berghof-
foundation.org/images/uploads/berghof_glossary_2012_10_peace_peacebuilding_peacemaking.pdf.  
2 Liam Mahony and Luis Enrigque Eguren, Unarmed Bodyguards: International Accompaniment for the Protection 
of Human Rights,  (West Hartford: Kumarian Press, 1997); Liam Mahony, Protective Presence: Field Strategies for 
Civilian Protection, (Geneva: Centre for Humanitarian Dialogue, 2006); Patrick G. Coy, 'Shared Risks and Research 
Dilemmas on a Peace Brigades International Team in Sri Lanka', Journal of Contemporary Ethnography 30, no. 5 
(2001): 575-606; Lisa Schirch, Civilian Peacekeeping Preventing Violence and Making Space for Democracy, 
(Uppsala: Life & Peace Institute, 2006). 
3 Ed Griffin-Nolan, 'Winess for Peace', in Nonviolent Interventions across Borders: A Recurent Vision, chap. 
Fifteen, eds. Yeshua Moser-Puangsuwan and Thomas Weber (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i Press, 2000); 
Christine Schweitzer, 'Introduction: Civilian Peacekeeping a Barely Tapped Resource', in Civilian Peacekeeping a 
Barely Tapped Resource, chap. One, ed. Christine Schweitzer (Belm-Vehrte: Sozio Publishing, 2010); Cordula 
Reiman, 'Nonviolent Peaceforce Evaluation of NP's Project in Mindanao, Philippines', (Swisspeace, 2010); C 
Gunduz and R Torralba, 'Evaluation of Nonviolent Peaceforce’s Project with the Civilian Protection Component of 
the International Monitoring Team in Mindanao', (Nonviolent Peaceforce, 2014); Kara Beckman and Kenneth B. 
Solberg, 'Measuring the Impact of Unarmed Civilian Peacekeeping: A Pilot Study ', (unpublished paper, 2013). 
4 Paul D Williams, 'Enhancing Civilian Protection in Peace Operations: Insights from Africa', (The African Center 
for Strategic Studies, 2010); Hugh Breakey et al., 'Enhancing Protection Capacity: Policy Guide to the 
Responsibility to Protect and the Protection of Civilians in Armed Con’ (Institute for Ethics, Governance and Law, 
2012); Alison Giffen, 'Enhancing the Protection of Civilians in Peace Operatons: From Policy to Practice', (Asia 
Pacific Civil-Military Centre of Excellence, 2011). 
5 Daniel H. Levine, 'Some Considerations for Civilian-Peacekeeper Protection Alliances', Ethics & Global Politics 
6, no. 1 (2013); Andrew Bonwick, 'Who Really Protects Civilians?', Development in Practice 16, no. 03-04 (2006): 
270-277; ,  Aditi Gorur, 'Community Self-Protection Strategies', (Stimson Center, 2013); Alison Giffen, 
'Community Perceptions as a Priority in Protection and Peacekeeping', (Stimson Center, 2013). 
6 1. Séverine Autesserre, 'Going Micro: Emerging and Future Peacekeeping Research', International 
Peacekeeping (13533312) 21, no. 4 (2014): 492-500, 
http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=sih&AN=98254555&site=ehost-live.; 1. Bahar Akman 
Imboden, 'Unpacking the Peacekeeping-Peacebuilding Nexus: A Human Security Proposal', Conflict Resolution 
Quarterly 30, no. 2 (2012): 173-96, 
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connection between UCP as peacekeeping and peacebuilding.is an exception.7 This paper attempts 
to weave these strands together, discussing and then demonstrating the ways in which UCP 
effectively protects civilians, augmenting their own protection strategies when possible, while 
simultaneously increasing safety for and supporting local peacebuilding work, some of which may 
grow out of these self-protection efforts. In light of Paffenholz’ work which critiques the support 
by international interveners of urban based, specialised NGOs in as the primary peacebuilding 
strategies,  finding ways to effectively support grassroots, rural, community rooted peacebuilding 
is particularly crucial.8  
The paper begins with a definition and brief explanation of UCP and its foundations.   This is 
followed by a discussion of some of the ways in which peacekeeping links to peacebuilding, 
highlighting interrelationships and the challenges these pose for both peacekeeping and 
peacebuilding.  While the use of these concepts is designed to highlight the differences between 
tasks, for different actors in various stages and levels of peace processes,9 in this paper we highlight 
the ways in which each set of tasks sets the context for and overlaps with other tasks. This is 
followed by a section which details how the strengths of UCP contribute to a context which is 
conducive to peacebuilding, as well as contributing to peacebuilding efforts directly. Finally the 
paper describes ongoing work by the Nonviolent Peaceforce (NP) in South Sudan, demonstrating 
the implementation of UCP and the connection between peacekeeping and peacebuilding in this 
particular context.  
 
What is Unarmed Civilian Peacekeeping? 
Unarmed Civilian Peacekeeping (UCP) is the practice of deploying unarmed civilians before, 
                                                 
http://search.ebscohost.com/login.aspx?direct=true&db=bth&AN=84763952&site=ehost-live (accessed 
Winter2012). 
7 Rolf Carriere, 'Another Peacekeeping Is Possible', Kosmos, Fall/Winter (2011) 
http://www.kosmosjournal.org/article/another-peacekeeping-is-possible/. 
8 Thania Paffenholz, 'International Peacebuilding Goes Local: Analysing Lederach's Conflict Transformation Theory 
and Its Ambivalent Encounter with 20 Years of Practice', Peacebuilding (2013): 1-17. 
9 Johan Galtung, Peace by Peaceful Means. Peace and Conflict, Development and Civilization, (London: Sage 
Publications, 1996). 
Formatted: English (United States)
  
6 
 
during, and after violent conflict, to prevent or reduce violence, to provide direct physical 
protection to other civilians, and to strengthen or build resilient local peace infrastructures. The 
purpose of UCP is to create a safer environment, or a ‘safer space’, for civilians to address their 
own needs, solve their own conflicts, and protect vulnerable individuals and populations in their 
midst. This ‘safer space’ is created through a strategic mix of key nonviolent engagement methods, 
principles, values, and skills (see figure 1).10 These efforts aim to influence potential perpetrators 
of violence to desist while supporting local actors to engage in peacebuilding as well as resume 
regular activities that may have been suspended out of fear.11 
 
 
 Figure 1: The spectrum of UCP (source: Oldenhuis et al, forthcoming) 
 
Scholars and practitioners have used different terms to describe the concept of UCP, such as 
proactive presence, protective accompaniment and unarmed civilian protection, and included 
different components in their definitions of UCP.12 Though there may be subtle are differences 
between the theories that lie behind the various definitions and terms as well as in the scope of 
methods that are covered by these terms, the respective practices share similarities.13 are very 
similar. 
 
                                                 
10 Huibert Oldenhuis, Rolf Carriere, Ellen Furnari, Mel Duncan., 'Strengthening Civilian Capacities to Protect 
Civilians from Violence: E-Learning Course', ( UNITAR and Nonviolent Peaceforce, forthcoming). 
11 Recognizing  the complexity of determining who is ‘local’ (see 1. Bruno Charbonneau, 'War and Peace in Côte 
D'ivoire: Violence, Agency, and the Local/International Line', International Peacekeeping 19, no. 4 (2012): 508-24, 
http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/13533312.2012.709776 (accessed 2012/08/01)., we use the term generally in line with 
Richmond’s use of the phrase ‘local-local’  1. Oliver P. Richmond, 'Becoming Liberal, Unbecoming 
Liberalism: Liberal-Local Hybridity Via the Everyday as a Response to the Paradoxes of Liberal Peacebuilding', 
Journal of Intervention and Statebuilding 3, no. 3 (2009): 324-44, http://dx.doi.org/10.1080/17502970903086719 
(accessed 2009/11/01).. 
12 Tim Wallis, 'Civilian Peacekeeping', Oxford Encyclopedia of Peace, ( Oxford University Press, 2009); Ellen 
Furnari, 'Understanding Effectiveness in Peacekeeping Operations: Exploring the Perspectives of Frontline 
Peacekeepers’ (PhD thesis, University of Otago, 2014) 38; Mahony, Protective Presence: Field Strategies; 
Schweitzer, Introduction, Civilian Peacekeeping, 9; Oldenhuis et.al, Strengthening Civilian Capacities. 
13 One of the major differences relates to the commitment to being nonpartisan. See 1. Patrick Coy, 
'Nonpartisanship, Interventionism and Legality in Accompaniment: Comparative Analyses of Peace Brigades 
International, Christian Peacemaker Teams, and the International Solidarity Movement', The International Journal of 
Human Rights 16, no. 7 (2012): 963-81. for a discussion of different organizations’ approach to accompaniment as 
nonpartisan protection versus providing solidarity and partisanship.  
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Though most attempts of defining and institutionalising UCP are of western origin and recent date, 
unarmed or nonviolent methods to interrupt violence and protect civilians can be found in many 
cultures throughout history.14  
 
Since Peace Brigades International (PBI) began fielding unarmed international staff to protect 
nonviolent civilian activists in Central America in the mid 1980s,15  a number of international 
nongovernmental organizations, such as the Fellowship of Reconciliation, Witness for Peace,16 
and Nonviolent Peaceforce have provided UCP in conflict areas around the world. The United 
Nations has increasingly recognized the value of UCP and some of its offices, such as the High 
Commissioner for Human Rights (OHCHR) in Nepal, have effectively engaged in UCP type 
efforts and prevented violence through the physical presence and engagement of unarmed civilian 
field staff.17  Recent research and evaluation suggests that UCP has had positive impacts in a 
number of projects.18 These impacts have included, among many: influencing armed actors to 
desist from harming civilians in particular contexts; supporting local civilian efforts to prevent 
violence and protect themselves through the creation of security meetings, peace committees, 
women’s peace teams; contributing to peace negotiations at the community and regional levels; 
and expanding the safety for local activists to engage in human rights and peace promoting 
activities.  
 
Unarmed Civilian Peacekeepers (UCPs) engage with affected communities at the grassroots level 
for extended periods of time. They provide, for example, protective accompaniment or presence 
                                                 
14 Moser-Puangsuwan and  Weber,  Nonviolent Intervention across Borders; Schirch, Civilian Peacekeeping: 
Preventing Violence; Gorur, Community Self-Protection Strategies. 
15 Mahony and Eguren, Unarmed Bodyguards. 
16 Thomas Weber, 'A History of Nonviolent Interpostion and Accompaniment', in Nonviolent Intervention across 
Borders: A Recurrent Vision, ed Yeshua Moser-Puangsuwan and Thomas Weber (Honolulu: University of Hawai'i 
Press, 2000) 15-41. 
17 Liam Mahony and Roger Nash, Influence on the Ground: Understanding and strengtheing the protection impact 
of United Nations human rights field, (Brewster: Fieldview Solutions, 2012) 20. 
18 Christine Schweitzer, 'Nine  Years  of Nonviolent  Peaceforce in  Sri  Lanka', (Hamburg: Institute  for  Peace  
Work  and  Nonviolent  Conflict  Transformatio, 2012); Peace Brigades International, ‘Indonesia Project Evalution’, 
(unpublished paper, 2004); Reiman, Nonviolent Peaceforce Mindanao; Gunduz and Torralba, Evaluation Nonviolent 
Peaceforce’s Project; Beckman and Solberg, Measuring Impact Civilian Peacekeeping. Add unarmed bodyguards, 
Janzen paper? Tiffany paper? 
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to threatened human rights defenders, Internally Displaced People (IDPs), or returnees. Their 
physical presence is usually provided for weeks, months and even years. Depending on the need, 
it may be at certain times and places, or all day and night in extreme threat contexts. may be 
provided twenty-four hours, seven days a week, for several weeks or even months. UCPs can also 
employ a range of other methods, such as ceasefire monitoring, rumour control, conflict mitigation, 
and capacity development. UCP is applicable at various stages of a conflict; during early stages to 
prevent violence and protect those working for nonviolent conflict, during crisis situations to stop 
violence,  or de-escalate tensions and protect civilians, and at later stages to help sustain peace 
agreements and secureing a safer space for peacebuilding. UCP has also contributed to national 
and international efforts to influence armed actors and negotiate peace. 
 
Not all contexts are equally suitable for UCP.  The effectiveness of UCP highly depends on its 
ability to create acceptance among local actors and engage with these actors as a visible, 
nonpartisan presence.  In places where such a presence is rejected (by the host government, non- 
state armed actors, or affected communities) or specifically targeted by armed groups, it is difficult, 
not appropriate, or simply not possible for UCP to operate or be effective. For instance members 
of a Christian Peacemaker Team in Baghdad were abducted and one killed, and the team withdrew.  
Similarly due to the levels of threat of abduction, the Nonviolent Peacefore in Mindanao had only 
a small team of national staff in some regions of Mindanao, visited regularly by international staff 
who did not live there.  That said, UCP interventions have been effective in many different contexts 
ranging from the civil wars in Guatemala, Mindanao Philippines, and Aceh Indonesia, to the 
current context of South Sudan, which is both post civil war and independence and currently as of 
this writing experiencing a new civil war.   
 
The role of UCP in Securing Space for Local Peacebuilding 
In this section we first discuss several ways in which peacekeeping is linked to both peacemaking 
and peacebuilding, and the implications of these interrelationships. After describing a number of 
concerns which arise from recognising this interrelationship, we describe how the particular 
Commented [EF4]: Do we want to say this and if so, maybe say 
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strengths of UCP can address these concerns and contribute positively not only to peacekeeping, 
but also peacemaking and peacebuilding tasks.  
As defined above, UCP works to prevent violence, protect people AND contribute to the 
strengthening or emergence of local work that will contribute to nonviolent political contestation.19 
These goals are shared with military peacekeeping or multidimensional peacekeeping.  We argue 
here, however, that UCP, in many contexts, can play a particularly useful role in bridging 
peacemaking, peacekeeping and peacebuilding. While sometimes referred to as three different 
stages or three different sets of tasks (see Galtung and Bhutros-Ghali 20) it is apparent that there 
are actually strong links between themse different sets of tasks, and that their implementation 
overlaps. For instance, Francis notes that including only, or giving primacy to armed groups in 
peace negotiations, often excludes nonviolent actors and the general public.21 This may have a 
somewhat perverse effect, encouraging actors to engage in political violence in order to be 
included, making peacekeeping and peacebuilding more challenging and the exclusion of many 
parts of society has long term ramifications for developing a lasting peace.  Johnstone suggests 
that while consent may be initially given (and at times under significant pressure), it must be 
maintained throughout the long peacekeeping and peacebuilding periods, and that it must 
ultimately have the consent of the wider public and not just the initial signatories.22 Thus it is clear 
that the process of peace negotiations, i.e. who is included and excluded in peacemaking as well 
as the provisions of any peace agreement,  sets the context for peacekeeping and peacebuilding.  
Similarly, we argue that the ability of a peacekeeping intervention to successfully prevent further 
violence, will impact both further peace negotiations and the potential to build a more sustainable 
peace through various peacebuilding efforts. Localized outbreaks of violence following a peace 
agreement can instigate widespread violence and undermine further peacemaking.23 As peace 
                                                 
19	The	authors	assume	that	the	goal	of	peacebuilding	is	nonviolent	political	contestation,	with	sufficient	safety	
for	civilians	to	participate	as	fully	as	they	choose,	rather	than	envisioning	an	end	to	political	conflict.		
20 Galtung, Peace by Peaceful Means; Boutros Boutros-Ghali, 'An Agenda for Peace  Preventive Diplomacy, 
Peacemaking and Peace-Keeping', (United Nations, 1992). 
21 Diana Francis, From Pacification to Peacebuilding a Call to Global Transformation, (London: Pluto Press, 2010). 
22 Ian Johnstone, 'Managing Consent in Contemporary Peacekeeping Operations', International Peacekeeping 18, 
no. 2 (2011): 168-82. 
23 S. N. Kalyvas, 'The Ontology of" Political Violence: Action and Identity in Civil Wars', Perspectives on Politics 
1(2003): 475. David K. Leonard, 'Social Contracts, Networks and Security in Tropical African Conflict States: An 
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agreements are often negotiated without all relevant actors included they may not address critical 
conflicts which are obstacles to peacebuilding and which fuel continuing cycles of violence.  At 
the same time, oOngoing violence undermines efforts to (re)build peace infrastructures, 
connections across divides, and address underlying drivers of conflict, all of which are essential 
aspects of peacebuilding or as ‘peace writ large’.24 There needs to be sufficient safety for civilians 
to engage in peacebuilding efforts without risking death or disappearance. Closing the circle, we 
argue that successful peacebuilding efforts which build connections, processes and which 
effectively address some or all of the underlying contributors to conflict, support implementation 
of agreements made through further peace settlements within peacemaking and a context in which 
local people cooperate with peacekeeping. Peacebuilding efforts implemented at the national level 
or in one particular region may positively influence peacemaking efforts at the local level (and 
vice versa) or in a different region. In other words, while it may be useful to conceptualize these 
as three different stages or sets of tasks, they are interrelated, may happen simultaneously at 
different levels and are factors in success overall.  
It follows that if peacekeeping is not effective at preventing violence and protecting people, a 
return to more overt, active political violence including a return to war, is more likely. According 
to the Uppsala Conflict Data ProgramUniversity, in the period between 1975 and 2011, only 125 
peace agreements out of 216 were followed by the termination of violence for at least five years.25 
This shows there is room for improvement in making a successful transition from peacemaking to 
peacebuilding and raises questions about the role of peacekeeping in accompanying and aiding 
this transition.  
 As argued above, peacekeeping plays a central role in supporting peacemaking efforts and 
contributing to a safe enough context for peacebuilding.  This suggests a number of issues 
which we note here briefly, and then discuss how UCP relates to them. Summarizing the 
                                                 
Overview', IDS Bulletin 44, no. 1 (2013): 1-14.1. Autesserre, 'Going Micro: Emerging and Future Peacekeeping 
Research'.. 
24 Mary Anderson and Lara Olson, Confronting War: Critical Lessons for Peace Practitioners (Cambridge, MA: 
The Collaborative for Development Action, Inc, 2003); Allison Giffen, ‘Community perceptions as a priority in 
protection and peacekeeping’, (Stimson Center, 2013) 
25 Stina Hogbladh, 'Peace Agreements 1975-2011 Updating the UCDP Peace Agreement Dataset' ( Uppsala Conflict 
Data Program, 2012). 
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implications of the above discussion suggests the following propositions: peacekeeping is an 
essential link between peacemaking and peacebuilding; the absence or inadequacy of 
peacekeeping may hamper or stall peacebuilding and development efforts; protection has been 
under-emphasized within the practice of peacebuilding,26 while unarmed or nonviolent 
methods have been under-emphasized within the practice of peacekeeping. Additionally 
though peacebuilding and peacekeeping are theoretically, and in many instances separate 
practices for foreign experts, reality on the ground is more complex or fluid. The practice of 
providing protection, security, and conflict resolution often occurs simultaneously or overlaps 
(e.g. in order to negotiate about security, relations need to be build). The local actors involved 
in these practices are often the same people, who don’t differentiate their actions as 
peacemaking peacekeeping or peacebuilding.  UCP recognizes this reality and plays a role in 
protecting and nurturing these local ‘peacebuilding’ efforts and local ‘peacebuilders’ in the 
bud. It doesn’t simply create security and when the situation is deemed stable hands over the 
keys to others. Its approach to security and protection is in a way peacebuilding as interventions 
are tailored to the context and needs of the people. This makes it an extremely valuable form 
of peacekeeping, from a peacebuilding perspective 
 
a) Peacekeeping (armed and unarmed) is an essential link between peacemaking and 
peacebuilding27 as it creates the security and stability needed to implement peace agreements, 
address root causes, and rebuild relations = peacekeeping is relevant for peacebuilding. 
b) Lack of or insufficient peacekeeping may hamper or stall peacebuilding and development 
efforts = effective and timely peacebuilding depends to some extent on effective peacekeeping. 
c)a) Protection has been under-emphasized within the practice of peacebuilding,28 while 
unarmed or nonviolent methods have been under-emphasized within the practice of 
peacekeeping = there is a need for more synergy between peacekeeping and peacebuilding. 
                                                 
26 Thania Paffenholz, 'Civil Society and Peacebuilding. Summary of Results for a Comparative Research Project', 
(Centre on Conflict Development and Peacebuilding 2009). 
27 Carriere, Another Peace is Possible. 
28 Thania Paffenholz, 'Civil Society and Peacebuilding. Summary of Results for a Comparative Research Project', 
(Centre on Conflict Development and Peacebuilding 2009). 
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d) Peacebuilding and peacekeeping are separate practices in theory and to some extent in practice 
for foreign experts, however the reality on the ground is more complex or fluid. The practice 
of providing protection, security, and conflict resolution often occurs simultaneously or 
overlaps (e.g. in order to negotiate about security, relations need to be build). The local actors 
involved in these practices are often the same people, who don’t differentiate their actions as 
peacemaking or peacebuilding (unlike foreign experts) = peacebuilding is already practiced 
by local actors at the crisis/peacekeeping (and peace making) stage even though it may not be 
considered peacebuilding and external peacebuilding efforts may not yet be launched. 
  
e) UCP recognizes this reality and plays a role in protecting and nurturing these local 
‘peacebuilding’ efforts and local ‘peacebuilders’ in the bud. It doesn’t simply create security 
and when the situation is deemed stable hands over the keys to the peacebuilders. Its approach 
to security and protection is in a way peacebuilding. It can be used before, during and after a 
violent situation, and tailor its peacekeeping interventions to the context and needs of the 
people = UCP is an ideal kind of peacekeeping from a peacebuilding perspective. 
 
UCP accomplishes these interventions through specific methodologies, which express the key 
principles of nonpartisanship (though as previously noted, not all organizations espouse 
nonpartisanship), independence, civilian to civilian partnerships, and nonviolence. Developing 
good relationships is one of the keys to effective peacekeeping generally and UCP in particular .29  
UCP relies on building good working relationships with all sectors of society in the areas where 
they work. The opportunity to build good relationships is enhanced by local perceptions of UCP 
interventions being nonpartisan, unarmed and therefore not a direct threat, and generally 
independent of any specific national or international agendas.30 These relationships are used not 
                                                 
29 Ellen Furnari, 'The Role of Relationships in the Emergence of Peace', in Behaviorial Processes and Systems of 
Peace, eds. Peter Verbeek and Benjamin A. Peters (John Wiley & Sons, Ltd., forthcoming 2015); Schweitzer, 
Introduction Civilian Peacekeeping. 
30 Ellen Furnari, ‘Unarmed Civilian Peacekeeping: A Potential Response to Peacekeepers’ and Critical Scholars’ 
Parallel Critiques of Multidimensional Peace Operations?’ (paper presented at the International Humanitarian 
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only for direct protection work but also to help connect different sectors of society and promote 
understanding/communication between track three and track two or track one31 as well as with 
other international interveners. Thus, although the work is focused on preventing violence and 
protecting civilians, which are seen as peacekeeping tasks, the strong grounding in local 
communities and with local actors across sectors means that the work of UCP contributes at times 
to both peacemaking and peacebuilding. For instance, in Mindanao, Philippines, unarmed civilian 
peacekeepers of Nonviolent Peaceforce were part of an international monitoring team and a 
member of the civilian protection component. In this capacity UCPs helped to link local 
community concerns and experiences to the peace negotiations. At the same time, by supporting 
the creation of local security meetings inclusive of civilian leaders as well as police and military, 
the project contributed to changes in the provision of community security. 
As UCPs develop strong relationships across sectors, people begin to turn to them with concerns.  
When news spreads of a violent attack or abduction, UCPs may be well positioned to investigate 
and either provide rumour control or early warning/early response planning in the case of looming 
violence. Doing this effectively requires a broad network of connections, built up over time, and 
reflecting that UCPs live in the communities where they work and are easily accessible.  Though 
not all UCP interventions include local staff, those that do, rely on their local knowledge to help 
understand the situation. Additionally UCPs are sometimes able to travel in places where others 
do not or cannot go. UCP security protocols generally allow using transportation such as 
motorbikes or walking, in order to reach remote areas unreachable otherwise. When local people 
are included in the staff as UCPs (not just drivers or in administrative positions), attempts are 
usually made to ensure that local staff come from various ethnicities, regions or in other words 
from different ‘sides’ of the conflict. Thus there is often a perception of inclusivity, which not only 
promotes trust by different sectors, but also models cooperation across divides, which in and of 
itself contributes to peacebuilding. 
                                                 
Studies Association, Istanbul, 2013); Oldenhuis et.al, Strengthening Civilian Capacities; Furnari, The Role of 
Relationships. 
31 John Paul Lederach, Building Peace: Sustainable Reconciliation in Divided Societies, (Washington DC: United 
States Institute of Peace, 1997). 
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In contrast, Currently peacekeeping currently undertaken by the UN, EU, AU or others is generally 
only one dimension of multidimensional peacekeeping operations.32 While the peacekeeping (as 
opposed to peace enforcement) is generally oriented toward supporting a negotiated peace 
agreement, most missions today are also tasked with protecting civilians. Other dimensions may 
address democratic elections, constitutional and security sector reforms and other efforts to 
strengthen governance, various humanitarian and development components, as well as economic 
reforms oriented toward supporting free markets. This combination of dimensions is frequently 
referred to as the liberal peace agenda,33 and is often described as related to the assumption that 
liberal democracies do not fight each other.34 This leads toward programming to establish a world 
of liberal democracies with free markets as the path to world peace and an argument that non-
liberal governance is a security issue for existing liberal democracies.35  These various components 
and the liberal peace agenda itself, make up much of what is oriented toward peacebuilding, rather 
than peacekeeping, within multidimensional operations. Others argue that this analysis obscures 
any indications of neo-colonialism, capitalist exploitation, and manifestation of self-serving great 
powers, which may influence the construction of these interventions.36  Francis believes that this 
combination of pre-packaged agendas, implemented by outside experts, often through the 
domination of military force in peacekeeping (or peace enforcement) roles, has undermined the 
legitimacy of the concept of peacebuilding itself.37  
                                                 
32 United Nations Department of Peacekeeping, 'United Nations Peacekeeping Operations: Principles and 
Guidelines', (United Nations 2008). 
33 William Durch, 'Restoring and Maintaining Peace: What We Know So Far', in Twenty-First-Century Peace 
Operations, Chap. One, ed. William J. Durch (Washington DC: United States Institute of Peace, 2006); Oliver P. 
Richmond, 'The Problem of Peace: Understanding the ‘Liberal Peace’', Conflict, Security & Development 6, no. 3 
(2006): 291-314; Oliver P. Richmond and Jason Franks, Liberal Peace Transitions Between Statebuilding and 
Peacebuilding,(Edinburgh: Edinburgh University Press, 2009).  
34 Robert Luckham, 'Democracy and Security: A Shotgun Marriage', in Rethinking the Liberal Peace: External 
Models and Local Alternatives, Chap. Five, ed. Shahrbanou Tadjbakhsh (London: Routledge, 2011). 
35 Kofi Annan and Nader Mousavizadeh, Interventions: A Life in War and Peace, (New York: Penguin Press, 2012). 
36 Kristoffer Lidén, Roger Mac Ginty, and Oliver P. Richmond, 'Introduction: Beyond Northern Epistemologies of 
Peace: Peacebuilding Reconstructed?', International Peacekeeping 16, no. 5 (2009): 587-98; Philip Cunliffe, 'Still 
the Spectre at the Feast: Comparisons between Peacekeeping and Imperialism in Peacekeeping Studies Today', 
International Peacekeeping 19, no. 4 (2012): 426-442; Oliver P. Richmond, 'A Geneology of Peace and Conflict 
Theory', in Palgrave Advances in Peacebuilding: Critical Developments and Approaches, Chap. One, ed. Oliver P. 
Richmond (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010); Vivienne Jabri, 'War, Government, Politics: A Critical 
Response to the Hegemony of the Liberal Peace', in Palgrave Advances in Peacebuilding: Critical Developments 
and Approaches, Chap. Two, ed. Oliver P. Richmond (Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010). 
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Unlike UCP interventions, the military and police components that engage directly in work to 
maintain a peace agreement, often are charged with supporting the government. They tend to live 
in military compounds, disconnected from nearby communities, with restricted rules of interaction 
with the community.  The stereotyped image is of peacekeepers in UN vehicles roaring through 
villages, creating disturbances rather than relationships which would be core for the assigned tasks 
(see Pouligny). All these factors may compromise the positive impact of peacekeeping on 
peacebuilding.  
UCP interventions generally do not engage with the liberal peace agenda and related models of 
peacebuilding. Multidimensional peacekeeping undertaken by multilateral organisations in 
relationship to governments and other armed actors, have several layers of military and civilian 
staff before reaching local civilians with programming shaped by the liberal agenda. In contrast 
UCP interventions operate within the principle of independence and civilian to civilian 
partnerships. They are also directly grounded in relationships with local people, independent, 
nonpartisan, and not connected to wider international agendas. As staff are unarmed, they are not 
involved in military domination.38 Staff may provide protection and input to humanitarian agencies 
which are part of or related to other agendas, but attempt to do so in a way centred on which keeps 
the needs of local people. front and centre. UCP interventions in other words, are rarely implicated 
in the liberal peace agenda and thus tend not to be effected by the resistance which may be 
catalysed in response.  UCP interventions support local efforts toward peace both by contributing 
to safer environments in which local people can do peacebuilding work as well as by providing 
training, security related dialogues and such that contribute to peacebuilding.  UCP projects may 
connect local level civilians to other individuals and agencies, which can strengthen the local work. 
UCPs bring their knowledge and expertise to support the (re)building of peace infrastructures at 
the local level, which may contribute to efforts at the regional and national levels as well. 
This has direct implications for peacebuilding and peace builders. UCP contributes to keeping 
local peacemakers and human rights defenders alive, so that these actors can play a role later on 
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in solidifying peace and promoting reconciliation. It builds their capacity and confidence, making 
it more likely that they will be involved in (effective) long-term peacebuilding efforts. UCP is 
oriented toward increasing local expertise, rather than bringing in outside experts, though it shares 
knowledge freely. UCP builds or strengthens local self-sustaining structures for the sake of 
security and protection, which may well be used for reconciliation and conflict transformation as 
well. UCP has a nonviolent approach to security and protection, using acceptance and relationship 
building instead of walls and guns. Not only does this prepare the ground for peacebuilding efforts 
and structures, which are founded on the same values and principles, but it also shows local actors 
that guns and force can be pushed back even further than often thought. It questions the notion of 
peace enforcement, interrupts the cycle of violence, and links means and ends. 
In situations of increasing stability, UCP is well positioned to facilitate a transition from 
peacekeeping to peacebuilding. This has a lot to do with its approach to security. Relying on the 
use of force, military protection actors often create security spaces with sharp boundaries, for 
example by cutting off any contacts between civilians in a ‘safe zone’ and armed factions in a ‘red 
zone’ soldiers may act as a physical buffer between conflicting groups or coerce perpetrators to 
halt their attack. In doing so, they create safety from armed actors.39 This may be chosen in certain 
situations, but it also risks disconnecting people from each other and interfering with self-
protection and survival strategies of communities. Instead, UCPs obtain their own security (and 
that of the people they protect) through maintaining relationships of trust and acceptance with all 
conflicting parties.  UCPsThey cultivate trust and acceptance with all conflict parties, so as to 
create spaces or situations, in which civilians can experience safety with members of other groups, 
including armed actors. By cultivating such spaces, they may become foci or ‘mediative spaces’40  
where conflicting parties can restore relations and begin to address the root causes of conflict. 
Finally, UCP encourages local participation in peacekeeping and by doing so strengthens the 
foundations of peacebuilding. Local actors, especially civilians, are often excluded from 
                                                 
39 Daniel H. Levine, 'Some Moral Considerations for Civilian-Peacekeeper Protection Alliances', (Center for 
International and Security Studies Maryland University, 2012) 17-18. 
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peacekeeping or security matters, unlike peacebuilding, which is more entrusted to local actors. 
As peacemaking, peacekeeping, and peacebuilding are highly interrelated processes at the field 
level, the relative exclusion of civilians, especially women, in peacekeeping and security 
processes, may undermine potential peacebuilding opportunities. Women may have different 
perspectives and priorities about security than men, which are often ignored and may result in 
insecurity that can be prevented. UCP often facilitates ongoing dialogues between security actors 
and women to identify and include their perspectives and priorities. Moreover, UCP may employ 
these women as peacekeepers or support them in establishing local peacekeeping units. These local 
peacekeepers often continue to keep and build peace after international peacekeepers have left the 
area and when security concerns are gradually replaced by the need for conflict transformation and 
reconciliation.  
 
UCP in Action: Nonviolent Peaceforce South Sudan 
In this section we illustrate how UCP can secure space for local peacebuilding by examining two 
examples of the efforts of Nonviolent Peaceforce (NP) in South Sudan. We will examine these 
efforts in relationship to the three dimensions of peacebuilding that were identified in the 
introduction of this paper; improving relationships between conflicted parties, changing individual 
attitudes and behaviours, and altering structural contradictions.  
The NP project in South Sudan began in 2010, in the lead up to the vote for independence, which 
took place in 2011. Beginning with a small team in one area (Mundri in Western Equitoria), by 
mid 2014 NP had approximately 450 international and 40 national staff working directly as 
peacekeepers in the field, spread out over tennine teams. Field locations in mid 2014 included the 
following states: Central Equatoria State, Unity State, Jonglei State, Lakes State, and Northern 
Bahr el Ghazal.41  The project works with and through local structures, traditional authorities and 
where present, local organisations. The main programme areas in 2014 included direct protection, 
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child protection, women’s participation in peace and security, strengthening local peace 
infrastructures, and protection mainstreaming.  
 
Facilitating a Peace Agreement in Western Equatoria State42 
Improving relations between conflict parties is an important dimension of peacebuilding as it 
reduces the long lasting effects of war-related hostilities and disrupted communication between 
the conflict parties. Improved relationships across divides can change attitudes and in particular 
behaviours of different groups toward each other, while at the same time helping to create or renew 
security related structures or processes which help minimize local, inter/intra communal 
contradictions. Nonviolent Peaceforce (NP) has done this in many different ways in South Sudan. 
NP’s initial focus in South Sudan was on supporting efforts aimed at rebuilding connections 
between communities and ethnic groups locked in cycles of revenge during the long civil war with 
Sudan,  which would lead to decreased violence against civilians. These efforts addressed both the 
need for creating sufficient safety for civilians to engage with each other, and providing various 
kinds of supports as needed, to these efforts. For example in 2011, shortly after their initial team 
arrived, NP was asked to intervene in a conflict between pastoralists and agriculturalists. Fighting 
erupted after a youth was killed in a particular county of Western Equatoria State and soon spread 
into a neighbouring county of Lakes State. Groups of Yyouth from both sides  were moving along 
state borders and violently attacking communities from the other side. Large-scale destruction of 
property and attacks on civilians ensued: between 9 February and 3 April 2011, over 6,000 homes 
were burned down, over 76,000 people were displaced, dozens of civilians including children were 
killed or injured, and hundreds of cattle and goats were raided. A team of NP staff, consisting of 
four expatriates and six nationals, was able to reach the remote area and bring the paramount chiefs 
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and other key community leaders together for discussions. With facilitation and patience over 
many months, the chiefs negotiated an agreement that would prevent further violence.  
While this can be seen as a relatively small impact, local people perceived it as deeply significant. 
In the past, different ethnic groups had been able to negotiate these differences with little or small 
scale violence. But the civil war (between north and south Sudan) had eroded traditional structures 
and the proliferation of guns meant that any violence tended to be lethal. Additionally, the 
intervention both modelled the possibility of settling differences non-violently and reminded 
people of their traditions to do so. It was a beginning of a new historical phase, after the many 
years of conflict during and after the civil war. The Deputy Governor of Western Equatoria State 
in South Sudan, Sapana Abuyi, stated in 2012: ‘There have been no conflicts since September. 
Usually the conflicts are in the dry season between September and April. This has been a 100% 
success. I give the credit to Nonviolent Peaceforce.’43 
What remains hidden from view, reading this brief account, are the efforts that led to this outcome 
as well as the efforts to maintain it. If NP had not already been based in the area and built a network 
of relations with various actors, it would not have been asked to intervene nor able to intervene 
quickly and effectively, if they could have intervened at all. If NP had not made additional efforts 
to build equal relationships on both sides, they could easily have been perceived as partisan and 
ignored by one side or, worse, attacked. Because NP had an office in Western Equatoria State, but 
not in Lakes State, home of the other conflicting partiesy, the team undertook several trips to Lakes 
State to build relationships with communities and government officials. After a long process of 
preparing the ground for intervention, NP endeavoured for months to create a conducive 
environment for local parties to reach an agreement. They also provided a constant protective 
presence within the affected communities, coordinated and participated in peace 
conferences/discussions, provided transportation when needed for others to attend, engaged with 
members of the national legislative assembly in the capital city to gain support from high-level 
government officials, and accompanied community leaders to peace talks. When a peace 
agreement was finally reached, NP continued its efforts to inform communities about the 
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agreement, monitor the implementation of the agreement, and facilitated the resolution of conflicts 
over (alleged) breaches of the agreement. Ultimately it required NP to engage in 115 separate 
interventions between February and September 2011 before the situation was deemed sufficiently 
stable.   
The case shows the fluidity between peacemaking, peacekeeping, and peacebuilding as well as the 
central role of relationship building in the process towards peace and stability. As local 
peacemakers were members of one side or the other, some of them were afraid to travel to territory 
controlled by the other side. The peacekeepers of NP provided protection through accompaniment 
to local peacemakers, which increased their confidence and security and allowed them to engage 
with the other side. They also provided protective presence during peace negotiations and to 
affected communities in the area, preventing further displacement. Thus, instead of creating 
separate security zones, where civilians from one side enjoy security from the other side, NP 
created a mediative space where both sides could enjoy security with each other and start the 
process of (re)building trust and relationships. As these relationships improved, attitudes and 
behaviours changed. The discussions and dialogues with people from many different social sectors 
not only built relationships, but also helped to create new processes, which at least began to address 
some of the underlying contradictions of land use, ethnicity, and political power.  
As UCPs use a fairly broad range of methods, including protection and conflict mitigation, they 
are well placed to operate in the spaces between peacemaking, peacekeeping, and peacebuilding. 
In most conflict areas, periods of crisis are followed by periods of relative calm and vice versa, 
which requires a flexibility of methods and strategies. Moreover, tThere is often not enough 
interaction between military security actors on the one hand and peacebuilding experts on the 
other.44 This easily creates a disconnect in the peace process and ignores its fluidity. Military 
peacekeepers have been urged to seek connections with civilian organizations involved with self-
protection and actively seek opportunities to bring stakeholders into contact with each other.45   
UCP can play a role in building relationships between these two groups. In the case of Western 
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Equatoria, NP built relationships with the police and the military, in particular with a unit of the 
Sudan People’s Liberation Army (SPLA), called the Joint Integrated Unit (JIU). The JIU, deployed 
to the area to bring the situation under control, had a difficult time engaging with the various parties 
as they were sent out to cover two states with one vehicle and no communication equipment. NP 
made an effort to include them in the process and as NP’s Country Director stated ‘they were one 
of the most genuine group of soldiers we had ever worked with and they were eager to be agents 
of peace…’.46 The inclusion of soldiers and other actors that are ‘hard to reach’ is often too easily 
ignored in peace projects, but it has proven to be an important factor of effectiveness.47   
The case also shows the necessity for sustained peacekeeping efforts at the field level. Building 
relationships and trust between conflicting parties is a difficult process that takes time and ongoing 
nurturing, in this case demonstrated by the 115 interventions.. The fact that 115 interventions were 
necessary to create, cement, and implement the peace agreement clearly shows this. Needless to 
say that these interventions could not have been made if NP had been operating from the capital 
city, had protocols that limited their presence in or transportation to local communities, or if NP 
had ended its presence and engagement at the field level after the conclusion of the peace 
agreement. As UCP is grounded in the notion that local actors should be the main drivers of 
change, these sustained peacekeeping efforts can at times take the form of very basic actions, such 
as driving a local chief across muddy roads to a distant village so that he can address issues relevant 
to the peace process. Though this may not appear a good use of time and resources to some or 
beneath the dignity of others, these seemingly insignificant efforts can be instrumental. A simple 
journey to a distant village, when the vehicle gets stuck in the mud and UCPs (men and women 
from various parts of the world) and chiefs are getting themselves dirty to pull it out together, can 
do more for relationships building than a whole series of formal meetings in distinguished offices. 
Addressing these local conflicts is critical, both for affected communities as for the wider context. 
While the violence that broke out in December 2013 in South Sudan was instigated by national 
figures with national political agendas, it is can be fed at the local level by local conflicts, 
resentments and retaliations for past violence. Re-establishing connections and communication 
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thus may have a longer term impact, in terms of at least preventing further deterioration of 
relationships and violent behaviours. While there are many factors affecting which regions of 
South Sudan are currently (at the time of this writing) experiencing high levels of political 
violence, it is telling to note that the areas such as this, where NP helped to address underlying 
conflicts, have not flared up. Providing a follow up summary in July 2014 the NP country director 
in South Sudan wrote: 
 We have continued to monitor the progress of the communities each migration season and have 
paid visits on both sides of the border since then to check in and see how things are going and offer 
support where needed.  There have been a couple of very minor incidents but no major conflict and 
as far as we know, no deaths since this agreement was made.  This year the situation in that area is 
much more tense as the displacement from Jonglei has pushed into Lakes and across the border 
into Western Equatoria where the communities reported a higher than usual amount of cattle 
keepers and their cattle and that they were all heavily armed.  We dispatched the Nzara based team 
to the area a number of times over the past 6 months and they have conducted a couple of 
community dialogues to help the affected populations think through their options. Tensions have 
been further escalated by defection and the movement of armed actors in the area. The governor 
has done an admirable job of diffusing the big issues, and has issued an order for the cattle keepers 
to pull out which we heard today has started to happen.  So in summary, the situation that we dealt 
with at the time has not repeated itself, the communities have been quite proactive about de-
escalation and nonviolent problem solving.  The impact of the bigger conflict has been felt but it 
has not deteriorated and there is generally a strong commitment to preventing outbreaks of 
violence.48 
 
 
Facilitating Community Security Meetings in Pibor 
Altering structural contradictions is widely regarded as essential for lasting peace. Many 
peacebuilding efforts aim to reform structures that fuel or reproduce conflict, or create structures 
that manage conflict and its grievances in a constructive way.  NP works to (re)build peace 
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infrastructures that contribute to safer environments for civilians. One of the most basic structures 
NP has worked to establish in South Sudan are community security meetings.49 In isolated areas 
communities often lack information about security issues and rumours of an imminent attack on 
the community, or direct violence in the area easily cause panic and displacement. At the same 
time there are numerous civilian protection needs. However, official and informal contact between 
civilians and protection actors (government, police, military, UN peacekeepers, INGO security 
officers) is often limited. Under these circumstances and in communities where they work, NP 
organizes regular community security meetings to bring protection actors and the community 
together in a safe space to exchange information and address concerns. Though NP may initiate 
these meetings, ownership of the meetings is gradually moved towards local actors. In some cases 
the meetings are used to address other urgent concerns not directly related to security.   
For civilians, community security meetings can be an opportunity to obtain information about the 
situation from various security actors, express security concerns, and develop solutions to issues 
related to safety and security. For protection actors it is an opportunity to engage in rumour control, 
increase community awareness of specific issues, and assess the perceptions of the community 
about security. Conversely, suchBuilding these relationships also hasve the potential to increase 
protection actors’ inclination and ability to fulfil their responsibilities as the people they are 
mandated to protect become known colleagues. As UCPs will eventually leave, these relationships 
are in some ways more important than the relationships UCPs have with local actors. For NP it has 
been an opportunity to strengthen the relationships between civilians and protection actors and 
change certain attitudes and behaviour, i.e. giving civilians the confidence, courage, and 
knowledge necessary to approach the military, police, government officials, and UN peacekeepers 
when future threats arise. It is also a reminder that international actors are present and attending to 
security related events. Conversely, such relationships also have the potential to increase 
protection actors’ inclination and ability to fulfil their responsibilities as the people they are 
mandated to protect become known colleagues. As UCPs will eventually leave, these relationships 
are in some ways more important than the relationships UCPs have with local actors. Though 
community security meetings may be held regularly and help to build relationships and increase 
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collaboration between communities and security actors, this usually is a long process that needs to 
be supported and nurtured.  
In certain areas NP has organised separate security meetings for women. only. Women are often 
excludednot included when it comes to security matters. And even if includedthey are, they often 
will not voice specific security concerns (or raise their voice at all).  In Pibor, for example, NP was 
told that in a previous attack on the community many women and children ran into a river and 
drowned. NP staff noticed that husbands told their wives to stay at home to watch their children 
during the community security meeting, NP organized, so that the men could attend. the meeting. 
NPThey responded by organizing separate security meetings at different times to give the women 
an opportunity to engage directly and more freely with security actors. For that particular group of 
women, it was the first time anyone had ever engaged them in such a way. Not only did this build 
the confidence of the women, it also helped to change the attitudes of some of the men as they 
witnessed that the views and concerns of women were taken seriously by the women and men of 
NP and the UN.   
Some of the women experienced sexual violence by ill-disciplined South Sudanese soldiers (about 
eighteen to twenty cases of rape per month), mostly when they were collecting water. However, 
they would not raise this issue in community security meetings with men as it was a taboo subject. 
It took NP staff a lot of trust building before women would speak to them individually about such 
issues. When NP talked with UN peacekeepers, explaining the situation to them, the peacekeepers 
eventually decided to collect their own water at the borehole where women were harassed most 
frequently. They would go there as another way to boost their presence. NP received feedback 
from the South Sudanese soldiers who commented they knew why NP had helped to organise these 
arrangements. The soldiers indicated they were a bit frustrated, but they moved on, and they’ve 
been leaving the women alone. 
Though the concerns over sexual violence were not initially voiced directly in the security 
meetings, the meetings became a space where these and other community concerns could be 
addressed with a diverse group of security actors. In Pibor NP worked together with UN 
peacekeepers on the ground, UNPOL, and the national police service to set up a system where they 
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would jointly patrol areas that the community had indicated were ‘insecure’. UNPOL, the UN 
peacekeepers, and the NP team took turns throughout the day, morning, afternoon, and evening, 
to conduct patrols in these areas. An emergency phone tree was also established and distributed 
among the key actors in the area. Furthermore, NP worked together with women to strengthen self-
protection strategies, such as accompanying each other or collecting water in large groups at 
specific times. Over a six to eight week period of doing these patrols and implementing these 
strategies, the number of reported rapes per week dropped from four or five to zero, as did other 
forms of violence that had been committed by soldiers in the area.  These processes began to 
change the attitudes of the women and others, about their proper role, build new relationships, and 
address some of the structural conditions which put women and men at risk. According to the team 
leader of NP project in Pibor:  
 Patrolling in Kandako was one of the most effective things we did. It not only made 
 civilians feel safer, I believe it actually made them safer as well. We started patrolling in March 
 2012 one week after a civilian was killed in the area. In the eight months  that we were patrolling 
 no civilians were shot. Two days after NP’s forced evacuation from Pibor County in October 
 2012 three people got shot. One of them died.50   
The case shows that the establishment of very basic structures such as regular community security 
meetings can achieve multiple outcomes, such as increasing the security in the area, building 
relations between community members and security actors, changing attitudes of community 
members towards security actors and vice versa, increasing collaboration between different 
security actors, and the creation of additional structures such as the joint-patrol system. The 
security meetings also became a stepping stone for capacity building on self-protection strategies 
and dialogue on other issues that the women considered urgent. It remains to be seen whether the 
newly built structures can or will be reinvigorated in Pibor. The project hopes to return there to 
contribute to recent local and regional peace efforts, which they previously supported, in the near 
future.51  
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It is important to note that in many communities, there is already peace work going on, and UCPs 
support this work by increasing the circumstances in which these activists can work. In some areas 
the community security meetings led to the creation of women peacekeeping teams, as some of 
the women participating in these meetings are already engaged in what might be termed 
peacebuilding work. For example Iin another community one example a number of women who 
had been active in their communities, working to prevent violence and promote peace, were 
engaged in various short term dialogue programs promoted by international agencies active in their 
region. They were frustrated by the lack of changes in the actual attitudes and behaviours, and the 
continued direct violence. They approached the local NP team and in discussions they came up 
with a plan to engage local youth directly. These youth had been involved in the political violence, 
making it difficult for community members from different ethnic groups to do their everyday tasks. 
NP staff accompanied the women in their initial visits to talk with these young men, increasing 
their security and simultaneously providing transportation. This engagement with specific 
perpetrators of violence against civilians was beginning to bear fruit, and violence in the 
community was decreasing. However, similarly to situation in Pibor, with the dramatic increase in 
direct violence in the area (related to renewed civil war), as well as changes in local officials, it 
has been hard to sustain this work. Still it shows promise for impact in a future time, when there 
is greater safety to engage in peacebuilding, as the women are rooted in their communities and 
committed to making changes.  
Even without a return to war or high levels of political violence, UCP interventions face many 
challenges to creating relationships and structures that can productively protect civilians, prevent 
violence, and support local peace efforts. In South Sudan the government and paramount chiefs 
change regularly, as do international peacekeepers (who often serve in six month rotations) and 
international aid workers. As a result, relationships must frequently be built anew and beginning 
structural positive changes may be undone as people with new attitudes and behaviours arrive. 
Without sufficient local grounding in conditions and knowledge of actual local actors, funding 
may be provided by international funders with unrealistic timeframes and for activities that are at 
best ineffective and at worst actually undermine the work. An organized local civil society might 
be able to provide the necessary continuity to hold structures together, maintain relationships with 
  
27 
 
institutions even though its representatives have changed, and elaborate on strategies that have 
been tried before, but in South Sudan it is often weak or absent. Though informal structures of 
some sort can always be found, it pushes UCPs often further into assuming a leadership position 
than they would like, challenging their principles of being nonpartisan and giving primacy to local 
actors.     
 
Conclusion 
While conceptually useful for analysing different actors and phases to building sustainable peace, 
there is clearly an interrelationship and overlap between peacemaking, peacekeeping, and 
peacebuilding. While efforts to make peace generally precede peacekeeping interventions, these 
peacemaking moments may actually be followed by a new cycle of violence. Thus peacekeepers 
fielded after a peace agreement has been signed oftenmay contend with direct political violence 
between armed actors and directed toward civilians. How peacekeepers respond to these periods 
of violence will impact further peacemaking and peacebuilding. And the effectiveness of early 
peacebuilding interventions undertaken by peacekeeping or other interveners, will help support 
ongoing peacekeeping and peacemaking. One way to visualise this is to see peacekeeping as a 
bridge between peacemaking and peacebuilding, with the traffic going both ways. Though not 
effective or even possible in all contexts, UCP is an ideal form of peacekeeping to effectively build 
this bridge as it combines the aims of peacekeeping with the tools and values of peacebuilding. 
UCP builds on civilian to civilian partnerships, nonviolence, independence, and nonpartisanship. 
It has an open and inclusive approach to security as it seeks to engage with threats of violence 
instead of blocking or eliminating them. Moreover, without promoting a larger agenda or blueprint, 
it broadens the base of participation by encouraging local actors to become peacekeepers and 
expand their peacebuilding work. In doing this, UCP can help to protect civilians, while building 
relationships between local, national and international actors, increasing opportunities to influence 
the attitudes and behaviour of these actors, and securing space for local actors to address 
underlying contradictions.  
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The work of NP in South Sudan provides a vivid demonstration of UCP in action and of the 
interplay between peacemaking, peacekeeping and peacebuilding. NP has made significant 
contributions to these three components of the peace processes and played a role in connecting 
these components and their main proponents with each other. The examples of Western Equatoria 
and Pibor illustrate that the process from violence to peace is not linear, but jumps back and forth. 
It also shows that even though there may be an overarching conflict that affects all of South Sudan, 
states, counties, and communities in South Sudan are differently affected by this conflict and have 
their own local conflicts. As UCP has a broad toolkit and is grounded in independence and the 
primacy of local actors, it is flexible to move back and forth between the different stages of the 
peace process and address the particular needs of communities. Given these strengths, the use of 
UCP could be expanded in appropriate contexts, to improve the protection of civilians while 
simultaneously supporting local peacebuilding work. Peacebuilding needs sufficient safety to take 
hold and peacekeeping needs grounding in local contexts in order to provide that safety and support 
local peacebuilding.  
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